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Recent years have ushered in a variety of reforms aimed at
increasing Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (“DEI”) in corporations.
From new state law requirements to market initiatives, a range of
public and private actors are prompting corporations to increase the
diversity of their boards and provide more information about their
efforts. Although these developments are encouraging signs of change,
a number of important limitations remain.
In Duty and Diversity, two distinguished voices in business law,
Professor Chris Brummer and former Chief Justice of the Delaware
Supreme Court Leo E. Strine, Jr., make the case that corporate law
provides “critical tools” to support corporations in taking effective action
to help reduce racial and gender inequality. 1 Specifically, they argue
that “the pursuit of Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion is solidly
authorized by the operation of traditional corporate law principles and
can even be easily squared with the views of those who embrace what
has come to be known as ‘shareholder primacy.’ ” 2 Examining
demographics in corporate boards and executive suites, the related
empirical debate, and issues of corporate reputation and risk
management, Brummer and Strine conclude that a sound business
rationale exists for corporations to cultivate diversity in their
organizations and to welcome working with a wide range of
stakeholders. 3
*
Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
1.
Chris Brummer & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Duty and Diversity, 75 VAND. L. REV. 1, 2 (2022).
2.
Id. at 5.
3.
Id. at 48 (“[W]e therefore believe that a plausible, indeed sound, business rationale exists
for businesses to cultivate collaboration by diverse minds; value merits-based factors instead of
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Relying on foundational corporate law principles, Brummer and
Strine highlight that corporate directors not only have broad authority
to promote a diverse and inclusive workforce and corporate culture,
“their affirmative obligation to act in the best interests of the
corporation can be understood to require it.” 4 Boards must “attend to
DEI, by monitoring company policies and practices that assure the
company’s compliance with important laws that focus on the equal
treatment of diverse applicants, employees, customers, communities,
and business partners.” 5 Furthermore, the wide discretion afforded to
corporate leaders to go beyond mere legal compliance provides an
opportunity to robustly address DEI within their organizations. 6
The Article makes a major contribution to corporate law, and
more specifically to the promotion of DEI within the field. Many aspects
of this excellent Article deserve attention, but this brief Response
modestly aims to amplify one: its embrace of a dynamic approach to
understanding fiduciary principles that is tightly connected to external
laws and social norms.
Above all, Brummer and Strine orient the pursuit of DEI as a
fiduciary matter. In doing so, they build on scholarly work that has
made the business case and emphasized the moral imperative of
corporations promoting diversity. 7 And they set their sights on
grounding DEI practices in everyday corporate law concerns by
incorporating “external” laws and evolving investor preferences into the
“internal” realm of fiduciary duty and board oversight. Importantly,
their approach treats corporate law as part of a broader legal
framework for corporate and fiduciary accountability, rather than as an
independent silo. 8 This approach deserves highlighting and raises
thought-provoking questions for future examination.
social origins; and welcome working with customers, communities, and partners from all segments
of society and the globe. These businesses will be better positioned to thrive. . . .”).
4.
Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
5.
Id. at 4.
6.
Id. at 67.
7.
For a sampling of this literature, see Lisa M. Fairfax, The Bottom Line on Corporate
Board Diversity: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Business Rationales for Diversity on Corporate
Boards, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 795; Lynne Dallas, The New Managerialism and Diversity on Corporate
Boards of Directors, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1363 (2002); Deborah L. Rhode & Amanda K. Packel, Diversity
on Corporate Boards: How Much Difference Does Difference Make?, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 377 (2014).
8.
For examples of other work that similarly takes a broad approach to understanding
corporate law in the wider context of legal frameworks concerning business regulation and
corporate accountability, see Colleen Honigsberg & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., The Many Modern
Sources of Business Law, in THE CORPORATE CONTRACT IN CHANGING TIMES: IS THE LAW KEEPING
UP? 206 (Steven Davidoff Solomon & Randall Stuart Thomas eds., 2019); Ann Lipton, Beyond
Internal and External: A Taxonomy of Mechanisms for Regulating Corporate Conduct, 2020 WIS.
L. REV. 657; Elizabeth Pollman, The Supreme Court and the Pro-Business Paradox, 135 HARV. L.
REV. 220 (2021).
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I. PROMOTING DIVERSITY THROUGH CORPORATE LAW
Over a half century has passed since Milton Friedman’s famous
essay that asserted that it is “nonsense” that “harm[s] the foundations
of a free society” to speak of corporations having a “social conscience” or
“responsibilities” such as “providing employment, eliminating
discrimination, avoiding pollution and whatever else may be the
catchwords of the contemporary crop of reformers.” 9 Brummer and
Strine begin by conjuring up Friedman’s controversial assertion and
providing a warning that its rhetorical appeal could continue to impede
necessary corporate action. As Brummer and Strine point out, in the
decades since Friedman wrote, “racial inequality, income and wage
inequality, and environmental harm remain huge societal problems.” 10
And there is reason to “fear that when the current moment passes,”
some will continue to take Friedman’s position on contemporary issues
of DEI practices and “argue that corporate leaders may not take action
to assure that their companies are going beyond the bare legal
minimum to promote these important values, because by doing so they
would be improperly diverting their focus from profit maximization.” 11
But the key move of the Article is not to interrogate corporate
social responsibility generally or even to reconcile DEI efforts with
profit maximization, but to center diversity as a mainstream issue of
corporate law and governance. One of the primary ways it does this is
to connect the “external”—legal sources for accountability such as
federal antidiscrimination laws—with the “internal”—corporate law
principles such as fiduciary duties. And this move by Brummer and
Strine helps to reveal one the weaknesses of Friedman’s approach in
the first instance—Friedman assumed that the social aspects of
corporate activity could be easily separated from profit-making such
that corporate leaders could simply choose to focus on making profits
for stockholders while “stay[ing] within the rules of the game.” 12 As
Brummer and Strine explain, “[a]ll too often, the issue of Diversity is
viewed as a cost center or something external to the mission of the
modern firm—driving criticisms of Diversity-oriented corporate
reforms as ‘virtue signaling at the expense of someone else.’ ” 13 Yet legal
9.
Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine—The Social Responsibility of Business Is To
Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 1970), https://www.nytimes.com/1970/09/13/archives/afriedman-doctrine-the-social-responsibility-of-business-is-to.html [https://perma.cc/D9LG-ZN4Z].
10. Brummer & Strine, supra note 1, at 3 n.1.
11. Id. at 4.
12. See Friedman, supra note 9.
13. Brummer & Strine, supra note 1, at 5.
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rules, shareholder preferences, and profitmaking are embedded in
social issues.
Moreover, the very framing of the internal-external dichotomy
has oversimplified the relationship between corporate law and other
areas of law. Viewing corporate law as “internal” and focused on
shareholders and profit maximizing, and other areas of law as
“external,” suggests that the purview of these two categories or spheres
is fundamentally different and that they can be clearly separated.
Just looking at the variety of laws and initiatives aimed at
promoting diversity in corporate boards and workforces, which
Brummer and Strine comprehensively examine, 14 illustrates the
difficulty of this task. Federal antidiscrimination laws might be deemed
“external,” but what about state laws such as California’s board
diversity statutes? In recent years, California has passed two separate
board diversity statutes, the first aimed at increasing gender diversity
on corporate boards, and the second aimed at increasing diversity from
“underrepresented communities” in terms of race, ethnicity, gender
identity, and sexual orientation. 15 Diversity has been a relatively
neglected topic in corporate law, not one that has been traditionally
viewed as central to its enterprise, therefore it is conceivable that some
observers might view such state laws as “external” rules for promoting
“social” values. 16 Yet board composition is a bread-and-butter concern
of corporate governance. And California’s new laws are part of its
corporate code. The latter points clearly weigh on the side of
understanding laws such as these as “internal” to corporations and
their governance. Taking another example, Nasdaq’s recently adopted
disclosure standard, approved by the Securities and Exchange
Commission, requires listed companies to disclose board-level diversity
statistics using a standardized template and have at least two “diverse”
directors or provide an explanation for not doing so. 17 Exchange rules
and disclosure mechanisms could easily fit into traditional conceptions
of internal governance, but are not state corporate law.
The categorization of laws or issues as “internal” and “external”
is not only subject to debate, however; the line between these purported
spheres is permeable. As Brummer and Strine observe: “the
14. Id. at 48–65 (“An Overview of Current Reforms to Encourage Corporate Diversity, Equity,
and Inclusion”).
15. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 301.3–.4 (West 2021).
16. They have also been challenged as unconstitutional. Brummer & Strine, supra note 1, at
60–61.
17. Nasdaq’s Diversity Rule: What Nasdaq-Listed Companies Should Know, NASDAQ (Oct. 1,
2021),
https://listingcenter.nasdaq.com/assets/Board%20Diversity%20Disclosure%20Five%20Things.pdf
[https://perma.cc/45P9-V8G8].
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internal/external dichotomy of the Friedman view is highly misleading:
the very DNA of corporate law’s most foundational duty, that of loyalty,
is as much outwardly facing as it is inwardly to the extent to which it
creates obligations to comply with all laws[.]” 18 This is because the duty
of loyalty requires fiduciaries to advance the best interests of the
corporation and its shareholders, which they must do by conducting
lawful business by lawful means. 19 Courts have interpreted this duty to
require making a good faith effort to ensure that the corporation has in
place information and reporting systems for the board to monitor
compliance with relevant laws. 20
Brummer and Strine pursue this vein of argument to call
attention to the mandatory and discretionary aspects of fiduciary duty
that support corporations pursuing strategies to address DEI. 21 The
duty of loyalty imposes affirmative obligations to comply with laws that
are important to the corporation and society. Fiduciaries must therefore
seek to assure corporate compliance with antidiscrimination laws and
cannot ignore red flags that indicate violations. This includes, for
example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, that prohibits employment
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin, as
well as laws that require corporations to provide equal access to
important services. 22 Corporate law is “not a field of law operating in
hermetic isolation of others” 23—it incorporates antidiscrimination
obligations.
But Brummer and Strine realize that this is likely not enough to
prompt corporations towards adequately addressing DEI, and thus they
also highlight the normative aspect of fiduciary duty for driving
behavior even when the risk of personal liability is remote. 24 The
oversight duty known as the Caremark doctrine plays a key role toward
this end. 25 Notably, Brummer and Strine believe that “Caremark’s
primary value is in the incentives it provides to corporate fiduciaries to
18. Brummer & Strine, supra note 1, at 9.
19. Id. at 4–5; see also Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Oversight and Disobedience, 72 VAND.
L. REV. 2013 (2019); Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Disobedience, 68 DUKE L.J. 709 (2019).
20. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996); Stone v. Ritter, 911
A.2d 362 (Del. 2006); Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805 (Del. 2019).
21. Brummer & Strine, supra note 1, at 65–86.
22. See id. at 49–52, 82.
23. Id. at 66.
24. Id. at 68 (noting “the duty of care was always important because normative duties, even
without liability potential, still had an important effect on behavior, and that is particularly so of
reputationally and mission-driven people like corporate directors” and that the Caremark doctrine
under the duty of good faith similarly drives behavior even though the standards for showing a
breach are difficult to satisfy).
25. In re Caremark Int’l., 698 A.2d 959.
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take proactive, preventative action to ensure that the corporation
complies with society’s fundamental expectations.” 26 Good faith efforts
at monitoring key compliance risks and responding to issues that arise
provide the basis for a record that might deter litigation or a defense to
Caremark claims that could support a motion to dismiss. 27 Combined
with the deferential business judgment rule, which provides substantial
room for boards to create a corporate strategy and culture that
rationally advances the best interests of the corporation and its
shareholders, Brummer and Strine conclude that corporate law
supports corporations taking robust action to address DEI. 28
To the extent these components of corporate law analysis—
obedience to “external” laws, oversight duties, and business judgment
protection—strike readers as unsurprising, that is indeed the point.
Brummer and Strine make a convincing case, with extensive detail,
that shows that the pursuit of DEI can easily be fit into traditional
principles of corporate law. This makes the increasing focus of investors
on environmental, social, and governance (“ESG”) 29 issues all the more
important as a cultural shift toward prioritizing DEI could drive change
in a system that supports it. 30
II. THE INTERNAL-EXTERNAL CONNECTION AND OPEN QUESTIONS
Although beyond the scope of Brummer and Strine’s argument,
their Article and its approach to corporate law connects to a number of
debates to watch in coming years. To start, the wide variety of public
and private initiatives aimed at promoting diversity in corporations
26. Id. at 75. On the role of norms in corporate law, see Edward B. Rock & Michael L.
Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U.
PA. L. REV. 1619 (2001).
27. Brummer & Strine, supra note 1, at 74–75; see also Pollman, Corporate Oversight and
Disobedience, supra note 19, at 2045 (discussing the standard for liability under Caremark and
good faith efforts at compliance as a defense); Roy Shapira, A New Caremark Era: Causes and
Consequences, 98 WASH. U. L. REV. 1857, 1870–72, 1880–83 (2021) (discussing record-keeping of
board monitoring and the use of section 220 books and records requests for investigating potential
Caremark claims).
28. Brummer & Strine, supra note 1, at 78 (“This forgiving test means boards have wide
discretion to promote corporate norms that treat employees and consumers with respect, and that
connect a reputation for integrity and fairness to long-term sustained profitability.”).
29. Leo E. Strine, Jr. has coined the term “EESG” to add an extra “E” for employees. Leo E.
Strine, Jr., Toward Fair and Sustainable Capitalism 6 (Roosevelt Inst., Working Paper No.
202008, 2020), https://rooseveltinstitute.org/publications/toward-fair-and-sustainable-capitalism/
[https://perma.cc/T3NG-WPKP]; Leo E. Strine, Jr., Kirby M. Smith & Reilly S. Steel, Caremark
and ESG, Perfect Together: A Practical Approach to Implementing an Integrated, Efficient, and
Effective Caremark and EESG Strategy, 106 IOWA L. REV. 1885, 1887 n.3 (2021).
30. See Dorothy S. Lund & Elizabeth Pollman, The Corporate Governance Machine, 121
COLUM. L. REV. 2563, 2631–33 (2021) (discussing the enlightened shareholder value approach and
how investors have pushed for increases in board diversity).
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have largely been embraced, but challenges have also surfaced. In
particular, California’s state corporate law mandates on board diversity
are currently being litigated on constitutional grounds. 31 These
lawsuits raise questions about the ongoing viability of legal efforts that
have taken quota-like approaches in the recent era of reforms. 32 In turn,
these legal battles raise interesting issues about whether fiduciaries
have obligations to comply with rules of questionable constitutional
status and what is the appropriate scope of relations for corporate law
to regulate. 33 Further, some of the sources of the new generation of
reforms are from nonstate actors such as exchanges and market players
such as banks, 34 which raise questions about what types of policies and
rules boards must oversee compliance with to act consistent with their
fiduciary obligations.
Deeper issues also emerge from new laws such as California’s
board diversity mandates concerning the scope of the internal affairs
doctrine and its legal basis. 35 Putting the internal-external dichotomy
into more nuanced context reveals tensions in foundational doctrines of
corporate law that have yet to be fully resolved.
Another important set of related issues is the trajectory of the
Caremark doctrine alongside the rising ESG movement. Brummer and
Strine argue that “[c]orporations have increasingly recognized that
effective DEI compliance efforts are required by Caremark[.]” 36 Given
the centrality of employment matters to most corporations and federal

31. See, e.g., Cooley LLP, New Challenge to California Board Diversity Laws, JD SUPRA (July
19, 2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/blog-new-challenge-to-california-board-5252056/
[https://perma.cc/GJ68-XKZU] (discussing constitutional challenges to California’s board diversity
statutes, SB 826 and AB 979); Courtney Murray & Eric Talley, Racial Diversity and Corporate
Governance: Assessing California’s New Board Diversity Mandate, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Oct. 28,
2020), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2020/10/28/racial-diversity-and-corporate-governanceassessing-californias-new-board-diversity-mandate/ [https://perma.cc/AP99-VUNS].
32. See, e.g., Joseph Grundfest, Mandating Gender Diversity in the Corporate Boardroom:
The Inevitable Failure of California’s SB 826 (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance at Stanford Univ.,
Working Paper No. 232, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3248791
[https://perma.cc/5XM2-JBB8] (discussing the constitutionality of California’s SB 826).
33. See generally Pollman, Corporate Disobedience, supra note 19 (discussing corporate law’s
fiduciary obligations in the face of legal gray areas).
34. See, e.g., Brummer & Strine, supra note 1, at 56–64 (discussing “market ‘EESG’
initiatives”).
35. See Jill E. Fisch & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Centros, California’s “Women on Boards”
Statute and the Scope of Regulatory Competition, 20 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 493, 515 (2019)
(examining California’s SB 826 and arguing that the internal affairs doctrine is a rule of “internal
ordering of shareholder economic relations”).
36. Brummer & Strine, supra note 1, at 84.
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antidiscrimination laws, their argument has significant force. 37 At the
same time, it is not clear how far courts will (or should) apply Caremark
oversight duties with regard to other issues that might fit under the
moniker of ESG, particularly those which are not yet subject to legal
requirements. 38
Finally, much remains to be seen about the course of the ESG
movement itself. Recent years have witnessed a meteoric rise of
investment interest in ESG, with trillions of assets under
management. 39 Major institutional investors have embraced board
diversity as a priority in recent years, 40 but other issues that might be
associated with the “S” in ESG might be harder to generate sufficient
agreement among investors. Coming years will reveal the range of
topics under the ESG umbrella that gain traction.
None of these open questions and related debates impact the
strength of Brummer and Strine’s case—they show through detailed
analysis and traditional corporate law principles that they are on solid
ground. And it is to their enormous credit that their contribution will
likely spark many fruitful further scholarly inquiries.
CONCLUSION
In Duty and Diversity, Brummer and Strine show that corporate
law can play a positive role in supporting business leaders in their
efforts to promote DEI. They do a great service to the field by carefully
detailing the current state of play in empirical research and corporate
law doctrine that not only allows corporations to take action on these
important issues but encourages it. Although oversimplified narratives
about maximizing profitmaking and the internal-external dichotomy
have had rhetorical appeal for decades, a clear-eyed examination of
foundational corporate law principles suggests that these narratives
37. See id. at 81 (“Civil rights laws comprise material, systemically important bedrock rules
that are essential for corporations to honor as a function of their fiduciary duties and due to their
charters from society to conduct only lawful business by lawful means.”).
38. For an argument against extending Caremark to ESG issues, see Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Don’t Compound the Caremark Mistake By Extending it to ESG Oversight (UCLA Sch. L. & Econ.
Rsch.
Paper,
Paper
No.
21-10,
2021),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3899528 [https://perma.cc/6SJB-7N9J].
39. See Lund & Pollman, supra note 30, at 2612–15 (explaining the evolution of corporate
social responsibility to the ESG movement); Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff,
Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a
Trustee, 72 STAN. L. REV. 381, 392–99 (2020) (describing the evolution of ESG investing);
Sustainable Investing Basics, U.S. SIF, https://www.ussif.org/sribasics [https://perma.cc/4YCG8PE4] (noting that over $17 trillion of assets under professional management in the United States
are under ESG or sustainable investing strategies).
40. See supra note 29; Brummer & Strine, supra note 1, at 57.
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should not be used as an excuse to impede progress toward more diverse
and inclusive organizations. Illuminating the connection of fiduciary
principles to external laws and social norms also shines a light on
related issues and debates that will shape corporate activity in
times ahead.

